444
WORLD-WIDE
VOLKSWAGEN CORP. ET AL. v.
WOODSON, DISTRICT JUDGE OF
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
No. 78-1078.
Argued October 3, 1979.
Decided January 21, 1980.
A products-liability action was instituted in an
Held:
Consistently with the Due Process Clause, the
(a) A state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist
"minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
(b) Here,
there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances that
are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in
585 P.2d 351, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and
STEWART, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 299. MARSHALL, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 313 BLACKMUN, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, post, p. 317.
Herbert Rubin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were
Dan A. Rogers, Bernard J. Wald, and Ian Ceresney.
Jefferson G. Greer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief
was Charles A. Whitebook.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is whether, consistently with the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale
distributor in a products-liability action, when the defendants' only
connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to New
York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma. [444
Respondents Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile from
petitioner Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway), in Massena, N. Y., in 1976. The
following year the Robinson family, who resided in
The Robinsons 2 subsequently brought a products-liability action
in the District Court for
The facts presented to the District Court showed that World-Wide is
incorporated and has its business office in New [444
Despite the apparent paucity of contacts between petitioners and
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied the writ, 585 P.2d 351 (1978), 6 holding that personal jurisdiction over
petitioners was authorized by
"In the case before us, the
product being sold and distributed by the petitioners is by its very design and
purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in
We granted certiorari, 440
U.S. 907 (1979), to consider an important constitutional question with
respect to state-court jurisdiction and to resolve a conflict between the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma and the highest courts of at least four other States.
9 We reverse.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant. Kulko v.
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as
there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in
terms of "reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said that
the defendant's contacts with the
The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause, in its role
as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation, have been substantially relaxed
over the years. As we noted in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra, at
222-223 [444
"Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."
The historical developments noted in McGee, of course, have
only accelerated in the generation since that case was decided.
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to
the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. The
economic interdependence of the States was foreseen and desired by the Framers.
In the Commerce Clause, they provided that the Nation was to be a common
market, a "free trade unit" in which the States are debarred from
acting as separable economic entities. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 538 (1949). But the Framers also intended that the States retain
many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State,
in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States -
a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hence, even while abandoning the shibboleth that "[t]he
authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits
of the State in which it is established," Pennoyer
v. Neff, supra, at 720, we emphasized that the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed "in the context of our
federal system of government," [444 U.S. 286, 294] International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S., at 317 , and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only
fairness, but also the "orderly administration of the laws," id., at
319. As we noted in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 250 -251 (1958):
"As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. [Citation omitted.] Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."
Thus, the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that
a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations." International Shoe Co. v.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, 10 we find in the record before us a total absence
of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any
exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity
whatsoever in
It is argued, however, that because an automobile is mobile by its very
design and purpose it was "foreseeable" that the Robinsons' Audi
would cause injury in
If foreseeability were the criterion, a local
California tire retailer could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a
blowout occurs there, see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (CA4 1956); a Wisconsin seller of a defective
automobile jack could be haled before a distant court for damage caused in New
Jersey, Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F.
Supp. 1205 (NJ 1974); or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire could be summoned
to Alaska to account for injuries happening there, see Uppgren
v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170-171 (Minn. 1969).
Every seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for
service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel. We
recently abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905), that the interest of a creditor in a debt could be
extinguished or otherwise affected by any State having transitory jurisdiction
over the debtor. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433
U.S. 186 (1977). Having interred the mechanical rule that a
creditor's amenability to a quasi in rem action
travels with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an analogous principle in
the present case. 11 [444
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
When a corporation "purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,"
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S., at 253 , it has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers,
or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State. Hence
if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or
Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit
in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been
the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not [444 U.S. 286, 298] exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. Cf. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
But there is no such or
similar basis for
In a variant on the previous argument, it is
contended that jurisdiction can be supported by the fact that petitioners earn
substantial revenue from goods used in
This argument seems to make the point that
the purchase of automobiles in
Because we find that petitioners have no
"contacts, ties, or relations" with the State of Oklahoma,
International Shoe Co. v.
Reversed.
[ Footnote 1 ] The driver of
the other automobile does not figure in the present litigation.
[ Footnote 2 ] Kay Robinson
sued on her own behalf. The two children sued through Harry Robinson as their
father and next friend.
[ Footnote 3 ] Volkswagen also
entered a special appearance in the District Court, but unlike World-Wide and
Seaway did not seek review in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and is not a
petitioner here. Both Volkswagen and Audi remain as defendants in the
litigation pending before the District Court in
[ Footnote 4 ] The papers
filed by the petitioners also claimed that the District Court lacked
"venue of the subject matter," App. 9, or "venue over the
subject matter," id., at 11.
[ Footnote 5 ] The District
Court's rulings are unreported, and appear at App. 13 and 20.
[ Footnote 6 ] Five judges
joined in the opinion. Two concurred in the result, without opinion, and one
concurred in part and dissented in part, also without opinion.
[ Footnote 7 ] This subsection
provides:
"A
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's
. . . causing tortious injury in this state by an act
or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state. . .
."
The State Supreme Court
rejected jurisdiction based on 1701.03 (a) (3), which authorizes jurisdiction
over any person "causing tortious injury in this
state by an act or omission in this state." Something in addition to the
infliction of tortious injury was required.
[ Footnote 8 ] Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (
[ Footnote 9 ] Cf. Tilley v.
Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968); Granite
States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974);
Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
[ Footnote 10 ] Respondents
argue, as a threshold matter, that petitioners waived any objections to
personal jurisdiction by (1) joining with their special appearances a challenge
to the District Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, see n.
4, supra, and (2) taking depositions on the merits of the case in Oklahoma. The
trial court, however, characterized the appearances as "special," and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, rather than finding jurisdiction waived, reached
and decided the statutory and constitutional questions. Cf. Kulko
v.
[ Footnote 11 ] Respondents'
counsel, at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-22, 29, sought to limit the
reach of the foreseeability standard by suggesting
that there is something unique about automobiles. It is true that automobiles
are uniquely mobile, see Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1, 6, and n. 11 (Me. 1979) (McKusick, C.
J.), that they did play a crucial role in the expansion of personal
jurisdiction through the fiction of implied consent, e.
g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), and that [444 U.S. 286, 297] some of the cases have
treated the automobile as a "dangerous instrumentality." But today,
under the regime of International Shoe, we see no difference for jurisdictional
purposes between an automobile and any other chattel. The "dangerous
instrumentality" concept apparently was never used to support personal
jurisdiction; and to the extent it has relevance today it bears not on
jurisdiction but on the possible desirability of imposing substantive
principles of tort law such as strict liability.
[ Footnote 12 ] As we have noted, petitioners earn no direct
revenues from these service centers. See supra, at 289.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. *
The Court holds that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment bars the States from asserting jurisdiction over the
defendants in these two cases. In each case the Court so decides because it
fails to find the "minimum contacts" that have been required since
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Because I believe that the
Court reads International Shoe and its progeny too narrowly, and because I
believe that the standards enunciated by those cases may already be obsolete as
constitutional boundaries, I dissent.
The Court's opinions focus tightly on the
existence of contacts between the forum and the defendant. In so doing, they
accord too little weight to the strength of the forum State's interest in the
case and fail to explore whether there [444 U.S.
286, 300] would be any actual
inconvenience to the defendant. The essential inquiry in locating the
constitutional limits on state-court jurisdiction over absent defendants is
whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction offends "`traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International
Shoe, supra, at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The clear focus in
International Shoe was on fairness and reasonableness. Kulko v.
"Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." 326 U.S., at 319 (emphasis added).
The existence of contacts, so
long as there were some, was merely one way of giving content to the
determination of fairness and reasonableness.
Surely International Shoe contemplated that
the significance of the contacts necessary to support jurisdiction would
diminish if some other consideration helped establish that jurisdiction would
be fair and reasonable. The interests of the State and other parties in
proceeding with the case in a particular forum are such considerations. McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), for instance, accorded
great importance to a State's "manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress" for its citizens. See also Kulko
v. California Superior Court, supra, at 92; Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Another consideration is the actual burden a
defendant [444
That considerations other than contacts
between the forum and the defendant are relevant necessarily means that the
Constitution does not require that trial be held in the State which has the
"best contacts" with the defendant. See Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 228 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The
defendant has no constitutional entitlement to the best forum or, for that
matter, to any particular forum. Under even the most restrictive view of
International Shoe, several States could have jurisdiction over a particular
cause of action. We need only determine whether the forum States in these cases
satisfy the constitutional minimum. 2 [444
In each of these cases, I would find that the
In No. 78-952, a number of considerations
suggest that
In addition, the burden on the defendant is
slight. As Judge Friendly has recognized, Shaffer emphasizes the importance of
identifying the real impact of the lawsuit. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy
Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200 (CA2 1978) (upholding the constitutionality of
jurisdiction in a very similar case under
Finally, even were the
relevant inquiry whether there are sufficient contacts between the forum
and the named defendant, I would find that such contacts exist. The insurer's
presence in
In sum, I would hold that appellant is not
deprived of due process by being required to submit to trial in Minnesota,
first because Minnesota has a sufficient interest in and connection [444 U.S. 286, 305] to this
litigation and to the real and nominal defendants, and second because the
burden on the nominal defendant is sufficiently slight.
In No. 78-1078, the interest of the
The petitioners are not unconnected with the
forum. Although both sell automobiles within limited sales territories, each
sold the automobile which in fact was driven to
An automobile simply is not a stationary item
or one designed to be used in one place. An automobile is intended to be moved
around. Someone in the business of selling large numbers of automobiles can
hardly plead ignorance of their mobility or pretend that the automobiles stay
put after they are sold. It is not merely that a dealer in automobiles foresees
that they will move. Ante, at 295. The dealer actually intends that the
purchasers will use the automobiles to travel to distant States where the
dealer does not directly "do business." The sale of an automobile
does purposefully inject the vehicle into the stream of interstate commerce so
that it can travel to distant States. See Kulko, 436 U.S., at 94 ; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
This case is similar to
The Court accepts that a State may exercise
jurisdiction over a distributor which "serves" that State
"indirectly" by "deliver[ing] its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the
Furthermore, an automobile seller derives
substantial benefits from States other than its own. A large part of the value
of automobiles is the extensive, nationwide network of highways. Significant
portions of that network have been constructed by and are maintained by the
individual States, including
Thus, the Court errs in its conclusion, ante,
at 299 (emphasis added), that "petitioners have no `contacts, ties, or
relations'" with
It may be that affirmance
of the judgments in these cases would approach the outer limits of
International Shoe's jurisdictional [444
International Shoe inherited its defendant
focus from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and represented the last major step this Court
has taken in the long process of liberalizing the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction. Though its flexible approach represented a major advance, the
structure of our society has changed in many significant ways since
International Shoe was decided in 1945. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957), recognized that "a
trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents." He
explained the trend as follows:
"In
part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national
economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more
States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount
of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."
As the Court acknowledges,
ante, at 292-293, both the nationalization of commerce and the ease of
transportation and communication have accelerated in the generation since 1957.
13 [444
In answering
the question whether or not it is fair and reasonable to allow a particular
forum to hold a trial binding on a particular defendant, the interests of the
The conclusion
I draw is that constitutional concepts of fairness no longer require the
extreme concern for defendants that was once necessary. Rather, as I wrote in dissent
from Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 220 (emphasis
added), minimum [444
The Court's opinion in No. 78-1078 suggests that the
defendant ought to be subject to a State's jurisdiction only if he has contacts
with the State "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there." 18 Ante, at 297. There is
nothing unreasonable or unfair, however, about recognizing commercial reality. Given the tremendous mobility of goods and people, and the
inability of businessmen to control where goods are taken by customers (or
retailers), I do not think that the defendant should be in complete control of
the geographical stretch of his amenability to suit. Jurisdiction is no
longer premised on the notion that nonresident defendants have somehow
impliedly consented to suit. People should understand that they are held
responsible for the consequences of their actions and that in our society most
actions have consequences affecting many States. When an action in fact causes
injury in another State, the actor should be prepared to answer for it there
unless defending in that State would be unfair for some reason other than that
a state boundary must be crossed. 19
In effect the Court is allowing defendants to assert
the sovereign [444
I would also, however, strip the defendant of an
unjustified veto power over certain very appropriate fora
- a power the defendant justifiably enjoyed long ago when communication and
travel over long distances were slow and unpredictable and when notions of
state sovereignty were impractical and exaggerated. But I repeat that that is
not today's world. If a plaintiff can show that his chosen forum State has a
sufficient interest in the litigation (or sufficient contacts with the
defendant), then the defendant who cannot show some real injury to a
constitutionally protected interest, see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy
Paving Corp., 579 F.2d, at 201, should have no constitutional excuse not to
appear. 21
The plaintiffs in each of these cases brought suit in a
forum with which they had significant contacts and which had significant
contacts with the litigation. I am not convinced that the defendants would
suffer any "heavy and disproportionate burden" in defending the
suits. Accordingly, I would hold [444
[ Footnote * ] [This opinion applies also to No. 78-952,
Rush et al. v. Savchuk, post, p. 320.]
[ Footnote 1 ] In fact, a courtroom just across the state line from a defendant may
often be far more convenient for the defendant than a courtroom in a distant
corner of his own State.
[ Footnote 2 ] The States themselves, of course, remain free to choose whether to extend
their jurisdiction to embrace all defendants over whom the Constitution would
permit exercise of jurisdiction.
[ Footnote 3 ] The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction pursuant to Minn. Stat. 571.41, subd. 2 (1978), which allows garnishment
of an insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify its insured. See
post, at 322-323, n. 3, and accompanying text. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as allowing suit only to
the insurance policy's liability limit. The court has held that the statute
embodies the rule of Seider v. Roth, 17 N. Y. 2d 111,
216 N. E. 2d 312 (1966).
[ Footnote 4 ] To say that these considerations are relevant is a far cry from saying
that they are "substituted for . . . contacts with the defendant and the
cause of action." Post, at 332. The forum's
interest in the litigation is an independent point of inquiry even under traditional
readings of International Shoe's progeny. If there is a shift in focus, it is
not away from "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation." Post, at 332 (emphasis added). Instead it is a shift within
the same accepted relationship from the connections between the defendant and
the forum to those between the forum and the litigation.
[ Footnote 5 ] In every International Shoe inquiry, the defendant, necessarily, is
outside the
[ Footnote 6 ] It is true that the insurance contract is not the subject of the
litigation. Post, at 329. But one of the undisputed
clauses of the insurance policy is that the insurer will defend this action and
pay any damages assessed, up to the policy limit. The very purpose of the
contract is to relieve the insured from having to defend himself, and under the
state statute there could be no suit absent the insurance contract. Thus, in a
real sense, the insurance contract is the source of the suit. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
[ Footnote 7 ] Were the defendant a real party subject to actual liability or were there
significant noneconomic consequences such as those
suggested by the Court's note 20, post, at 331, a more substantial connection
with the
[ Footnote 8 ] On the basis of this fact the state court inferred that the petitioners
derived substantial revenue from goods used in
[ Footnote 9 ] Moreover, imposing liability in this case would not so undermine
certainty as to destroy an automobile dealer's ability to do business.
According jurisdiction does not expand liability except in the marginal case
where a plaintiff cannot afford to bring an action except in the plaintiff's
own State. In addition, these petitioners are represented by insurance
companies. They not only could, but did, purchase insurance to protect them
should they stand trial and lose the case. The costs of the insurance no doubt
are passed on to customers.
[ Footnote 10 ] One might argue that it was more predictable that the pollutants would
reach
[ Footnote 11 ] For example, I cannot understand the constitutional distinction between
selling an item in
[ Footnote 12 ] The manufacturer in the case cited by the Court, Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761
(1961), had no more control over which States its goods would reach than did
the petitioners in this case.
[ Footnote 13 ] Statistics help illustrate the amazing expansion in mobility since
International Shoe. The number of revenue passenger-miles flown on [444
[ Footnote 14 ] The Court has
recognized that there are cases where the interests of justice can turn the
focus of the jurisdictional inquiry away from the contracts between a defendant
and the
[ Footnote 15 ] In some cases, the
inquiry will resemble the inquiry commonly undertaken in determining which
State's law to apply. That it is fair to apply a State's law to a nonresident
defendant is clearly relevant in determining whether it is fair to subject the
defendant to jurisdiction in that State. Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 225 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). See n. 19, infra.
[ Footnote 16 ] Such a standard need be
no more uncertain than the Court's test "in which few answers will be
written `in black and white. The greys are dominant
and even among them the shades are innumerable.' Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)." Kulko v.
[ Footnote 17 ] This strong emphasis on
the State's interest is nothing new. This Court, permitting the forum to
exercise jurisdiction over nonresident claimants to a trust largely on the
basis of the forum's interest in closing the trust, stated:
"[T]he interest of
each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its
laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to
determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its
procedure accords full opportunity to [444 U.S. 286, 311] appear and be heard." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
[ Footnote 18 ] The Court suggests that this is the critical foreseeability rather than the likelihood that the product
will go to the
[ Footnote 19 ] One consideration that might create some unfairness
would be if the choice of forum also imposed on the defendant an unfavorable substantive
law which the defendant could justly have assumed would not apply. See n. 15, supra.
[ Footnote 20 ] For instance, in No. 78-952, if the plaintiff were
not a bona fide resident of
[ Footnote 21 ] Frequently, of course, the defendant will be able to
influence the choice of forum through traditional doctrines, such as venue or
forum non conveniens, permitting the transfer of
litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S., at 228 , n. 8 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting).
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
dissenting.
For over 30
years the standard by which to measure the constitutionally permissible reach
of state-court jurisdiction has been well established:
"[D]ue process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
International Shoe Co. v.
The corollary, that the Due Process Clause forbids the assertion of
jurisdiction over a defendant "with which the state has no contacts, ties,
or relations," 326 U.S., at 319 , is equally clear. The concepts of fairness and
substantial justice as applied to an evaluation of "the quality and nature
of the [defendant's] activity," ibid., are not
readily susceptible of further definition, however, and it is not surprising
that the constitutional standard is easier to state than to apply.
This is a
difficult case, and reasonable minds may differ as to whether respondents have
alleged a sufficient "relationship among the defendant[s], the forum, and
the litigation," Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), to satisfy the
requirements of International Shoe. I am concerned, however, that the majority
has reached its result by taking an unnecessarily narrow view of petitioners'
forum-related conduct. The majority asserts that "respondents seek to base
jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi
automobile, sold in New York to New York [444
Petitioners are
sellers of a product whose utility derives from its mobility. The unique
importance of the automobile in today's society, which is discussed in MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S dissenting opinion, post, at 318, needs no further
elaboration. Petitioners know that their customers buy cars not only to make
short trips, but also to travel long distances. In fact, the nationwide service
network with which they are affiliated was designed to facilitate and encourage
such travel. Seaway would be unlikely to sell many cars if authorized service
were available only in Massena, N. Y. Moreover, local dealers normally derive a
substantial portion of their revenues from their service operations and thereby
obtain a further economic benefit from the opportunity to service cars which
were sold in other States. It is apparent that petitioners have not attempted
to minimize the chance that their activities will have effects in other States;
on the contrary, they have chosen to do business in a way that increases that
chance, because it is to their economic advantage to do so.
To be sure,
petitioners could not know in advance that this particular automobile would be
driven to
It is misleading
for the majority to characterize the argument in favor of jurisdiction as one
of "`foreseeability' alone." Ante, at 295.
As economic entities petitioners reach out from
The majority
apparently acknowledges that if a product is purchased in the
I sympathize with
the majority's concern that persons ought to be able to structure their conduct
so as not to be subject to suit in distant forums. But that may not always be
possible. Some activities by their very nature may foreclose the option of
conducting them in such a way as to avoid subjecting oneself to jurisdiction in
multiple forums. This is by no means to say that all sellers of automobiles
should be subject to suit everywhere; but a distributor of automobiles to a multistate market and a local automobile dealer who makes
himself part of a nationwide network of dealerships can fairly expect that the
cars they sell may cause injury in distant States and that they may be called
on to defend a resulting lawsuit there.
In light of the
quality and nature of petitioners' activity, the majority's reliance on Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, is misplaced. Kulko involved the assertion of state-court jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual in connection with an action to modify his child
custody rights and support obligations. His only contact with the
Manifestly, the "quality and nature"
of commercial activity is different, for purposes of the International Shoe
test, from actions from which a defendant obtains no economic advantage.
Commercial activity is more likely to cause effects in a larger sphere, and the
actor derives an economic benefit from the activity that makes it fair to
require him to answer for his conduct where its effects are felt. The profits
may be used to pay the costs of suit, and knowing that the activity is likely
to have effects in other States the defendant can readily insure against the
costs of those effects, thereby sparing himself much of the inconvenience of
defending in a distant forum.
Of course, the Constitution forbids the
exercise of jurisdiction if the defendant had no judicially cognizable contacts
with the forum. But as the majority acknowledges, if such contacts are present
the jurisdictional inquiry requires a balancing of various interests and
policies. See ante, at 292; Rush v. Savchuk, post, at
332. I believe such contacts are to be found here and that, considering all of
the interests and policies at stake, requiring petitioners to defend this
action in
[ Footnote * ] Similarly, I believe the Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), was influenced by the fact that trust administration has
traditionally been considered a peculiarly local activity.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
I confess that I am somewhat puzzled why the plaintiffs in this litigation
are so insistent that the regional distributor and the retail dealer, the
petitioners here, who handled the ill-fated Audi automobile involved in this
litigation, be named defendants. It would appear that the manufacturer and the [444
For me, a critical factor in the disposition of the litigation is the nature
of the instrumentality under consideration. It has been said that we are a
nation on wheels. What we are concerned with here is the automobile and its
peripatetic character. One need only examine our national network of interstate
highways, or make an appearance on one of them, or observe the variety of
license plates present not only on those highways but in any metropolitan area,
to realize that any automobile is likely to wander far from its place of
licensure or from its place of distribution and retail sale. Miles
per gallon on the highway (as well as in the city) and mileage per thankful are
familiar allegations in manufacturers' advertisements today. To expect
that any new automobile will remain in the vicinity of its retail sale - like
the 1914 electric car driven by the proverbial "little old lady" - is
to blink at reality. The automobile is intended for distance as well as for
transportation within a limited area.
It therefore seems to me not unreasonable - and certainly not
unconstitutional and beyond the reach of the principles laid down in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny - to uphold Oklahoma jurisdiction over
this New York distributor and this New York dealer when the accident happened
in Oklahoma. I see nothing more unfair for them than for the manufacturer and
the importer. All are in the business of providing vehicles that spread out
over the highways of our several States. It is not too much to anticipate at
the time of distribution and at the time of retail sale that this Audi would be
in
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN points out in his dissent, ante, at 307, that an
automobile dealer derives substantial benefits from States other than its own.
The same is true of the regional distributor.
My position need not now take me beyond the automobile and the professional
who does business by way of distributing and retailing automobiles. Cases
concerning other instrumentalities will be dealt with as they arise and in
their own contexts.
I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma. Because the Court reverses that judgment, it will now be about
parsing every variant in the myriad of motor vehicle fact situations that
present themselves. Some will justify jurisdiction and others will not. All
will depend on the "contact" that the Court sees fit to perceive in
the individual case. [444